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Abstract: The main tenet of this paper is that human communication is first and
foremost a matter of negotiating commitments, rather than one of conveying
intentions, beliefs, and other mental states. Every speech act causes the speaker
to become committed to the hearer to act on a propositional content. Hence,
commitments are relations between speakers, hearers, and propositions.
Their purpose is to enable speakers and hearers to coordinate their actions:
communication is coordinated action for action coordination. To illustrate the
potential of the approach, commitment-based analyses are offered for a repres-
entative sample of speech act types, conversational implicatures, as well as for
common ground.
Keywords: commitment, speech acts, common ground, conversational
implicatures
1 Introduction
The principal units of human communication are speech acts: promises, orders,
reminders, and so on. But what are speech acts? Basically, there are two ways
of answering that question. Consider a perfectly mundane domestic episode: by
uttering the sentence “I’ll do the dishes”, Barney promises Betty to do the dishes.
One way of construing Barney’s utterance is that it serves to express Barney’s
intention to do the dishes. On this construal, understanding speech acts requires
that one take a mentalist perspective, for their purported purpose is to convey
information about what’s on the speaker’s mind. Alternatively, we can take a
social perspective and say that the purpose of Barney’s promise is to undertake a
commitment to Betty: as a result of saying, “I’ll do the dishes”, Barney becomes
committed to Betty to do the dishes.
*Corresponding author: Bart Geurts, Faculteit der Filosofie, Theologie en
Religiewetenschappen, Radboud Universiteit Nijmegen, Postbus 9103, 6500 HD Nijmegen,
The Netherlands; Higher School of Economics, Moscow, Russia, E-mail: brtgrts@gmail.com
Brought to you by | Radboud University Nijmegen
Authenticated
Download Date | 11/14/19 1:53 PM
2 Bart Geurts
These two stances do not necessarily exclude one another, and some theories
seek to accommodate both, but in general the emphasis is on the psychological
rather than the social aspects of communication, and in fact the view that
human communication is essentially a form of “mind reading” holds sway in
large parts of pragmatics, the cognitive sciences, and the philosophy of mind. It
is well known, however, that such an approach raises developmental issues. If
understanding a promise is primarily a matter of comprehending the speaker’s
intentions, children must be able to attribute intentions before they can under-
stand promises. But how likely is it that two-year olds have this skill, and how
do they learn to attribute intentions and other psychological states if not through
communication?
Since there are no working models of how children might learn to attribute
mental states before they start dealing with speech acts, it is tempting to stipulate
that mental-state attribution doesn’t have to be learned in the first place: it’s in
the genes. But this flight into nativism merely passes the buck from development
to evolution, and the same questions that arose with respect to the ontogeny of
communication and mental-state attribution now arise with respect to their
phylogeny.
In this paper I take the view that communication is, first and foremost, a mat-
ter of negotiating social commitments. This shift in emphasis is motivated in part
by the expectation that a commitment-based approach offers a sounder basis for
understanding language learning and evolution than a mentalist approach. How-
ever, I believe it is also of interest in its own right to see how much explanatory
mileage we can get out of a commitment-based account. In a nutshell, that is
the project of this paper, and although it is intended as a prelude to theories of
learning and evolution, developmental and evolutionary issues will be touched
upon only superficially. My main goal is to make a case for the claim that social
commitments are the fulcrum of communication.
I believe it is uncontroversial to say that any theory of communication will
have to deal with at least the following topics: speech acts, common ground,
linguistic conventions, and pragmatic inference. To this list I would like to add
a fifth item: a theory of communication should bring together the social and
mentalist perspectives in a way that is significantly more enlightening than the
mere acknowledgement that these two perspectives exist. In this paper I will con-
sider four of these topics, and show what a commitment-based approach has
to offer in each case. Speech acts and common ground come to the fore in Sec-
tion 3 and Section 4, respectively; Section 5 is about pragmatic inference and the
connection between social and mentalist aspects of communication. Linguistic
conventions will not be discussed here, but in Geurts (2018a) I present an account
of conventions that complements the story of this paper.
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2 Coordination and commitment
Being the ultrasocial species that we are, we are in constant need of having to
coordinate our actions so that we can play football, have conferences, do the
dishes together, live in the same house, build rockets, fight each other in court,
and so on. Our interactions unfold in time, often long stretches of it, and playing
it by ear is generally a poor strategy. Einstein is alleged to have said that “the best
preparation for the future is to live as if there were none”, but if he did say that, he
was wrong. We wouldn’t get anything done if we stopped planning for the future.
Our social interactions, in particular, are unthinkable without advance plan-
ning, and if others couldn’t be counted upon to do their parts, joint planswouldn’t
be possible. That’s why we make commitments: we commit ourselves to act as
goalkeeper or umpire, to chair a session or give a talk, to wash or dry the dishes,
and so on. Making commitments is a form of expectation management; it is a way
of permitting others to rely on us to act in certain ways, so that they can coordin-
ate their activities with ours. These activities may but need not involve common
goals. For example, living in the same building calls for coordination between ten-
ants, but that does not necessarily imply that they share a common goal, except
perhaps a very general one, which is achieved mainly by refraining from, rather
than engaging in, certain kinds of activities.
While commitments sometimes come about implicitly, they may also be
negotiated explicitly. That’s what communication is for, and promises are the
paradigm case. If Albert promises Brenda to do the dishes, he commits himself
to do the dishes, and by the same token Brenda becomes entitled to act on the
assumption that Albert will do the dishes. Assertions, too, create commitments.
If Brenda informs Albert that she is pregnant, implying that he is the father, they
will typically end up being mutually committed in a bewildering variety of ways,
all of which spring from Brenda’s initial commitment, brought about by her asser-
tion, to act on the assumption that she is pregnant. In the following I explore the
hypothesis that the chief purpose of speech acts is to enable speakers to share
commitments that enable them to coordinate their actions: communication is
coordinated action for action coordination. This hypothesis is meant to hold not
only for promises and assertions, but across the illocutionary board.
The concept of commitment has been used widely and variously in the philo-
sophy of language, rhetoric, speech act theory, and formal theories of dialogue.
The theory proposed here borrows ideas from many sources, notably Hamblin
(1971), Brandom (1994), Kibble (2006a, 2006b), and Krifka (2015) (see De Bra-
banter and Dendale 2008 for a survey of the commitment literature). On my
account, commitment is a three-place relation between two individuals, a and
b, and a propositional content, p: a is committed to b to act on p, or Ca,bp for
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short. So, if Albert promises Brenda to do the dishes, then as a result of Albert’s
promise: Ca,b(a will do the dishes). To say that a is committed to b to act on p is to
say that a is committed to b to act in a way that is consistent with the truth of p. I
take this to entail that b is entitled by a to act on p, and should bwish to act on p,
and p turn out false, then bmay hold a responsible for the consequences. Hence,
commitment is a normative concept. It belongs to the same family of relations as
obligation, duty, and responsibility, all of which are primarily directed towards
others. That is, commitments are social relations first and foremost, not psycho-
logical states: a can be committed to act on p without suspecting that he is thus
committed, and indeed without even entertaining the possibility that p.
Brenda’s announcement, “I’m pregnant”, causes her to become committed
to act on the proposition Brenda is pregnant. In principle, this commitment
constrains any acts Brenda may consider, including her speech acts. In fact, com-
mitments often reveal themselves chiefly by constraining one’s communicative
dispositions. To vary the example, if Brenda asserts that ancient Sparta was a
republic, there may be little if anything in her practical behaviour to show for her
commitment to act on Sparta was a republic, but in her communicative beha-
viour it will manifest itself by a willingness to reaffirm and defend that Sparta
was a republic, to omit Sparta when listing the monarchies of ancient Greece, to
baulk at references to the kings of Sparta, and so on.
Since, by definition, propositional attitudes are relations between individuals
and propositions, commitment is a propositional attitude of sorts, but it is a three-
place relation between pairs of individuals and propositional contents (cf. Singh
2000). Thus commitments are relativised to others in a way that psychological
attitudes are not. This feature enables us to undertake conflicting commitments,
with or without impunity. Having just promised Albert to marry him, Brenda goes
on tomake the same promise to Clyde. That’s not nice of Brenda, since at least one
of her suitors is bound to be disappointed (assuming, if only for example’s sake,
that bigamy is not an option). Nevertheless, everything is in order from a com-
municative point of view: Brenda has successfully undertaken two commitments,
albeit conflicting ones. Compare this with a scenario in which Brenda promises
Albert to marry him and Clyde. That would be communicative misconduct: one
cannot be committed to one and the same person to bring about an impossible
state of affairs.
Though one can believe and even know what one is committed to, com-
mitments as such are neither psychological nor epistemic. This has important
consequences for the logic of commitment. For example, it is a contested issue
in the logic of belief whether or not beliefs are closed under entailment: if a
believes p and p entails q, does it follow that a believes q? Although the answer
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is clearly “No”, belief logics typically stipulate that belief is closed under entail-
ment, excusing this postulate as a convenient “idealisation” (whatever that may
mean). Compared to belief, the case of commitment is straightforward: if Ca,bp
and p entails q, then Ca,bq. If Albert commits himself to act on Oxygen is heavier
than nitrogen, he thereby also becomes committed to act on Nitrogen is lighter
than oxygen. He may not realise that he is thus committed, but that doesn’t alter
the fact that he is. By undertaking a commitment, a speaker ipso facto undertakes
any further commitments flowing from it. In this respect, commitment is in the
same boat as other normative notions, like permission, obligation, and so on.
It is in the nature of commitments that they are relatively stable, for otherwise
they couldn’t serve their purpose of enabling action coordination (cf. Bratman
1987 on what he calls “inertia”). This is not to say that commitments are written
in stone. Occasionally, we break commitments due to unforeseen circumstances,
negligence, or forgetfulness. Also, a commitment may be retracted expressly: I
promised my spouse to buy coffee on my way home, but my car broke down, and
therefore I have to renege onmy promise; or, I toldmy son that Napoleonwas fifty-
two when he died, but discover I was mistaken, and therefore correct myself.1 In
such cases, commitments persist up to the point at which they are withdrawn.
Once undertaken, a commitment holds in the present (I am committed now to
buy coffee on my way home), and persists by default.
Thus far I have spoken about commitment as a social relationship subserving
action coordination between individuals. But each of us must coordinate his
own actions, too, and as Bratman (1987) has emphasised, interpersonal and
intrapersonal coordination are closely related:
To achieve complex goals I must coordinate my present and future activi-
ties. And I need also to coordinate my activities with yours. Anyone who has
managed to write a lecture, pick up a book at the library, attend a committee
meeting, and then pick up a child at school will be familiar with the former
type of intrapersonal coordination. And anyone who has managed to arrange
and participate in a committee meeting with several colleagues will be
familiar with the latter sort of interpersonal coordination. (Bratman 1987: 2)
Just as we make commitments to others so as to coordinate our actions with
theirs, we make commitments to ourselves to coordinate our own actions. Thus
commitment has two faces: a social and a private one. Given Ca,bp, let’s say a’s
commitment is “social” if a ≠ b, and “private” if a = b. I undertake a private com-
mitment, for example, when I decide to readMobyDick, havemuesli for breakfast,
1 MacFarlane (2011) argues that retractability is a problem for several mainstream theories of
assertion. His arguments hold for other speech acts, too.
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or buy a new shirt. It might be thought that social and private commitments are
very different beasts, but as they serve the same purpose, i.e. action coordination,
and do so in similar ways, it makes sense to pursue a unified view on commit-
ment; which is what I will do. That said, since this paper is about communication
as an interpersonal activity, social commitments will be in the limelight, though
private commitments will play a significant supporting role in the analysis of
conversational implicatures (Section 5).
To sumup,my concept of commitment is a big tent in two respects. First, since
action coordination is a concern that straddles the traditional divide between
the individual and the social, the same goes for commitment as I understand
it. Secondly, I contend that all speech acts are alike in that they cause commit-
ments for the speaker, and that a major part of communicative interaction can be
explained in these terms. In the following I try to provide support for these claims.
3 Speech acts
Even if the vast literature on speech acts is rife with conflicting opinions, obser-
vations, and terminology, there is a broad consensus on what the major speech
act types are (cf. Kissine 2013b). They are three: commissives (e.g. promises), di-
rectives (e.g. requests), and constatives (e.g. assertions).2 Questions are usually
treated as requests for information, and therefore classified with the directives.
There is less agreement on the speech acts falling outside the major categor-
ies, which mainly consist of expressive and conventional uses (e.g. respectively,
“Ouch!” and “I baptise thee ‘Oliphant’ ”).
The purpose of this section is to provide commitment-based analyses of a rep-
resentative sample of all the major and minor speech act types. I don’t intend
to defend this or any other taxonomy of speech acts, nor do I intend to provide
definitions of any speech act type or subtype. Those have been objectives of many
studies on speech acts, but they aren’t mine, and to be honest, I doubt that they
are viable goals in the first place. My aim is merely to show that a commitment-
based account can elucidate the workings of a fair selection of speech act types,
and thus support my claim that commitment is at the heart of communication.3
2 My use of the labels “commissive”, “directive”, and “constative” is in line with that of Bach
and Harnish (1979) and Kissine (2013a), among others, and seems to be fairly common.
3 Although commitment is by no means an obscure concept, there have been relatively few
attempts to apply it across more than one or two speech act types (especially promising and
assertion). Exceptions are Gazdar (1981), Singh (2000), Kibble (2006a, 2006b), Beyssade and
Marandin (2009), and Lauer (2013).
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Let’s start by comparing and contrasting three examples, one for each of the
major speech act types, supposing in each case that Alfred addresses Bertha:
(1) I’ll walk the dog. [commissive]
(2) Could you close the door, please? [directive]
(3) Your sister called. [constative]
In a normal run of events, by uttering one of these sentences, Alfred undertakes
a commitment whose propositional content is Alfred will walk the dog, in the
case of (1), Bertha will close the door, in the case of (2), and Bertha’s sister
called, in the case of (3). These propositions diverge in several ways, the most
important of which is that the first two specify a goal of Alfred’s (his commitment
is telic), whereas the third one does not (so Alfred’s commitment is atelic).4 The
telltale difference between (1) and (2) concerns who must see to it that Alfred’s
goal is achieved, which in the former case is Alfred himself, while in the latter it
is Bertha. Crucially, however, in each of these cases Alfred’s commitment is to act
in accordance with the propositional content in question, regardless whether it is
telic or not. Although this may be less obvious in the second example, it seems to
me that, as a rule, Alfred will ask Bertha to close the door only if he is reasonably
sure that she will do so, and if he isn’t sure and pleading with Bertha to close the
door, he may be committing himself to act on Bertha will close the door in order
that Bertha make it true. (More on this topic in Section 3.2.)
Generalising boldly from these examples, I propose that:
i. Every speech act S addressed by a to b causes a commitment Ca,bp.
ii. If S is constative, a’s commitment is atelic.
iii. If S is commissive, a’s commitment is telic and pwill not be true unless a sees
to its truth.
iv. If S is directive, a’s commitment is telic and pwill not be true unless b sees to
its truth.
These statements are not to be understood as attempts at defining speech act
types, or even merely to specify some of the necessary conditions for being a con-
stative, commissive, or directive. Rather, they are intended as rough and ready
generalisations which still have to prove their mettle, and in that spirit I will
elaborate and defend them in the following.
It is not uncommon for theories of speech acts to distinguish between com-
mitment to the truth of a proposition p and commitment to make p true, and to
4 It is sometimes supposed that goals are psychological entities, but that is not how I understand
the term, and I believe that my understanding agrees with everyday usage: we freely attribute
nutritional and procreational goals to bees, bats, and even bacteria, but it is doubtful that all or
any of these creatures have minds.
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associate these two types with assertions and promises, respectively (e.g. Bran-
dom 1994, Walton and Krabbe 1995, Beyssade and Marandin 2009). In the same
vein, Searle (1975) famously took Anscombe’s (1957) notion of “direction of fit” to
separate constatives, whose illocutionary point is to get their propositional con-
tent to fit the world, from commissives and directives, whose direction of fit is
world-to-content. My telic/atelic dichotomy is similar to these distinctions, but
different from both, in two main respects.
First, and most importantly, on my understanding, a commitment is always a
commitment only to act in ways that are consistent with the truth of a given pro-
position p. Telic commitments just have a special feature that atelic commitments
lack, in that they represent speakers’ goals. If Alfred is committed to the goal of
making breakfast, then he is committed to act on Alfred will make breakfast.
Alfred may doubt that he will be able to make breakfast, and even be convinced
that he won’t be, but in either case his commitment to Bertha will be unaffected.
And Bertha, for her part, may doubt Alfred’s ability to make breakfast so much
that she decides not to act on Alfred will make breakfast; but that doesn’t alter
the fact that she is entitled, by Alfred, to act on that proposition.
Second, I assume that the speaker may be committed to a goal that can only
be realised by the addressee, which entails that my notion of commitment to a
goal p is broader than that of commitment to make p true. Thus it becomes pos-
sible to hold that directives are like commissives in that they commit the speaker
to a goal, even if that goal can only be realised by the addressee.
In the remainder of this section we will have a closer look at each of the three
major speech act types (Sections 3.1–3.3), aswell as someminor ones (Section 3.4),
developing the foregoing sketch as we proceed.
3.1 Commissives
In their 1979 monograph, Bach and Harnish noted that commissives are the only
type of speech act for which Austin’s (1962) label had been universally retained
(Bach and Harnish 1979: 49). That observation still seems to hold. Commissives
are also the speech acts for which a commitment-based analysis is the most
widely accepted. Besides promises, commissives are usually taken to include
threats, offers, bids, and bets. Commissives are so-called because they commit the
speaker to the goal of making p true. In the simplest cases p represents a future
act or state of the speaker’s, as in “I’ll deal with it” or “I’ll be there.” But “Clyde
will be there” may count as a promise, too, and if it does, the speaker undertakes
to see to it that Clyde will be there. A typical promise presents p as good for the
addressee; a threat presents p as bad.
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Offers are standardly classified as commisives, but Alfred’s offer to wear a tie
only commits him to wear a tie if Bertha accepts his offer. In an attempt to accom-
modate this observation, Bach and Harnish (1979: 49–50) define commissives
as “acts of obligating oneself or of proposing to obligate oneself to do some-
thing specified in the propositional content”. However, this breaks the unity of
the class: just as eating kelp and proposing to eat kelp are different things alto-
gether, committing oneself to wear a tie is not at all the same thing as proposing
to commit oneself to wear a tie. Unity is restored by conditionalising the proposi-
tional content of the speaker’s commitment. Let p be Alfred will wear a tie. Then
Alfred’s commitment is of the form Ca,b((Cb,ap)→ p), i.e. Alfred is committed to a
conditional goal, which entails that he becomes committed to wear a tie if and
when Bertha becomes committed to act on Alfred will wear a tie. On this ana-
lysis, offers are conditional promises, and Alfred’s offer is not very different from,
“I’ll wear a tie if you do.” Bids, bets, and threats, too, are usually conditional,
often explicitly so.
Conditional speech acts have had a somewhat troubled history, which is
nicely summed up by Walker’s (1975: 145) rhetorical question: “How can one per-
form a speech act in a conditional way, any more than one can stand on one’s
head in a conditional way?” Walker’s puzzle dissolves if we analyse conditional
speech acts as creating commitments to act on conditional propositions.
3.2 Directives
While it is not unusual to analyse certain speech act types (especially com-
missives and constatives) as creating speaker commitments, there seems to be a
general feeling that this line of analysis doesn’t extend to directives. Thus, Green
(2007: 76) states that “it is hard to see how imperatives such as commands involve
the undertaking of commitment.” The implicature is clear: directives (or imperat-
ives, as Green calls them) don’t create speaker commitments. If this were true,
it would be a major setback for my project. But I don’t think it is true. If Ber-
tha asks Alfred to walk the dog, she patently becomes committed to the goal that
Alfred walk the dog. Not only is Bertha’s commitment evidenced already by the
very fact that she asks Alfred to walk the dog, it may well go further than that.
For example, if Alfred cannot find the dog and Bertha knows where it is, then
normally speaking she will be committed to share her intelligence with him.
So I take it to be plausible to suppose that by asking Alfred to walk the dog,
Bertha becomes committed to the goal that Alfred walk the dog. On my analysis,
this entails that Bertha becomes committed to act on Alfred will walk the dog,
and I suspect that this consequence may be harder to accept. Surely, Bertha may
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ask Alfred to walk the dog even if she doubts that he will do so. But if that is the
case, then how can it make sense for her to undertake the commitment to act on
Alfredwill walk the dog? This issue, whichwas briefly raised in the introduction
to this section, is an important one, because it bears on commitments in general.
To begin with, I assume that speakers tend only to undertake commitments
that are likely to be shared by their addressees. In the case at hand this is to say
that, generally speaking, Bertha will not ask Alfred to walk the dog unless she is
reasonably confident that he will act accordingly. But what if confidence is lack-
ing? What if it is common ground between Bertha and Alfred that he hates the
dog and will be most reluctant to walk it? Then it may still make sense for Bertha
to undertake to act on Alfred will walk the dog in order to persuade Alfred to do
likewise. For “acting on” may imply, say, that Bertha will go on nagging Alfred for
a considerable while, in which case Alfred may well give in at some point. Hence,
it may be rational to undertake a commitment to act on p even if it is common
knowledge that p is not very likely to be true.
Following Frege (1918) and many authors since, questions may be viewed as
requests for information. As is well known, this isn’t always right, but let’s start
with a case in which it is. If Bertha asks Alfred, “Are you gay?”, she doesn’t merely
expect him to say either yes or no: as suggested by Krifka (2015), Bertha’s ques-
tion causes her to become committed to act on the goal that Alfred will commit
himself either to being gay or to not being gay. Schematically, this comes out as
Cb,aF(Ca,bp ∨ Ca,b¬p), where F is a futurity marker often glossable as “forthwith”,
since questions are usually expected to be answered without undue delay.
This analysis doesn’t quite capture the idea that questions are requests for
information, but it goes a long way; for the most likely scenario in which Bertha
commits herself to F(Ca,bp ∨ Ca,b¬p) is one in which she doesn’t know whether
p or ¬p, and expects Alfred to inform her which is the case. Therefore, while the
proposed analysis helps to explain that questions can be requests for information,
it doesn’t entail that they must be. Which is what we want, for if a teacher asks
a pupil, “Was Napoleon Greek?”, she doesn’t expect him to enlighten her on the
matter, but still expects him to commit himself one way or the other.
Despite the fact that permissives are often classified as directives (e.g. Bach
and Harnish 1979; Searle and Vanderveken 1985), giving permission is unlike an
order or a question in that it need not be an incentive to action, nor need it be
telic in the way directives typically are. For example, if Alfred tells Bertha, “Have
a seat!”, it may but need not be the case that Alfred thereby becomes committed
to the goal that Bertha sit down. Following Searle and Vanderveken (1985: 202)
and Kissine (2013a: 109–110), I propose that the basic function of permissives is
to remove a potential obstacle on the speaker’s part to a potential action on the
part of the addressee. Let p be the proposition that Bertha will have a seat. Then
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the effect of Alfred’s utterance, when interpreted in a seemingly non-committal
way, is that Ca,b¬Ca,b¬p: Alfred becomes committed to not being committed to act
on ¬p. Which is just to say that Bertha may sit down as far as Alfred is concerned.
3.3 Constatives
The characteristic feature of constatives is that they bring about atelic commit-
ments. If Agnes tells Bruce that his sister called, for example, she obviously does
not commit herself to the goal that Bruce’s sister called (if that is grammatical
at all). Agnes’s assertion constrains her actions, but doesn’t steer them in any
particular direction.5
Assertions have been heralded as the paradigm constatives, and have
received more scholarly attention than any other type of speech act, especially
from philosophers, who have touted assertion as the vehicle of choice for shar-
ing knowledge (see Pagin (2014) for an excellent survey). On the philosophers’
view, the principal purpose of assertions is to share knowledge between speakers,
and several claims flow from this. First, that assertion has a privileged connec-
tion with the notion of truth. We accept some assertions as true and reject others
as false. Allegedly, this practice doesn’t extend to other speech acts,6 and is in
line with the philosophers’ view: given that knowledge entails truth, assertions
are supposed to carry true information. Secondly, a speaker who conveys that
he knows that such-and-such is the case is expected to be able to justify his
claim when challenged to do so. Thirdly, since knowledge entails belief, asser-
tions should carry information that the speaker believes to be true. Hence, one
of the characteristic features of assertions is that they express speakers’ beliefs.
Fourth, if the purpose of assertion is to share knowledge, then a typical effect of
the assertion that p will be that p becomes part of the common ground between
speaker and hearer.
5 Just to be sure, to say that it is a characteristic feature of constatives that they bring about
atelic commitments is not to imply that it is an essential feature of the class. As I have confessed
already, I am sceptical about any form of speech act essentialism, and I am doubly sceptical
about any attempt at capturing the essence of constatives in general and assertion in particular.
I feel I must be explicit on this point because speech act essentialism is still rife, and especially
in the literature on assertion, statements like the following are quite common: “By an account
of assertion is here meant a theory of what it consists in to make an assertion. According to such
accounts, there are deep properties of assertion: specifying those properties is specifying what a
speaker essentially does in making an assertion [ . . . ].” (Pagin 2014: 1, no emphasis added)
6 Actually, this claim is prima facie false: promises can be true or false, warnings and oaths can
be false, and so on. Of course, we might try to establish that the adjectives “true” and “false” are
homonymous, but that may be hard to do without begging the question.
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Thus, the philosophers’ concept of assertion is associated with a cluster
of concepts that includes truth, justifiability, belief, and common ground
(MacFarlane 2011; Goldberg 2015). But even if this cluster of associations seals
“the philosophical significance of assertoric speech”, as the subtitle of Gold-
berg’s (2015) monograph has it, it doesn’t follow that a theory of everyday
communication must grant it an exclusive status as well. Be that as it may, the
philosopher’s view on assertion will make a convenient foil for discussing its
associated concepts.
First, truth. Onmy account, every speech act commits the speaker to the truth
of some proposition. Sharing knowledge is just one form of action coordination
amongst many, and therefore epistemic concerns are less urgent for understand-
ing communication than they are often held to be. To put it bluntly, if our first
priority is to coordinate our actions, it may be more important to ensure that our
commitments are the same than that they agree with the facts. If this reeks of
French philosophy, I must insist that I am a great fan of knowledge, objective
truth, and all that. What I question is merely the idea that this cluster of vener-
able concepts is of special importance to a theory of communication. Exchanging
epistemically kosher information is one of the things we seek to do by way of our
linguistic interactions, but more than half a century after Austin andWittgenstein
it can hardly be controversial that it is not the only thing (cf. Geurts 2018b).
Second, justifiability. While it seems correct that some uses of constatives
render the speaker liable for justifying his claim, this is by no means always the
case. If I assert that I’m thirsty, for example, it would be odd for you to ask, “How
do you know?” On the other hand, many uses of non-constatives may well be
followed up by a request for justification:7
(4) Agnes: Have you seen my hamster?
Bruce: Why do you ask?
Of course, it is true that some constatives warrant the expectation that the
speaker can provide justification of a special kind, notably, evidence. But then the
justificatory expectations associated with other speech act types are special, too,
and as we have just seen, some assertions don’t warrant such expectations at all.
Third, common ground. It is uncontroversial that constatives cause the com-
mon ground to expand. However, the same holds for non-constatives and I argue
7 As pointed out to me by Mark Jary, you might challenge my assertion that I’m thirsty: “You
can’t be thirsty: you just drank two litres of water.” However, if I had no idea why I felt thirsty, it
would be unreasonable for you to insist on a justification. Jary also objects to example (4) on the
grounds that Bruce’s request for justification concerns not the question itself, but Agnes’s asking
it. But that depends on what we take “the question itself” to be. On Krifka’s analysis (adopted in
Section 3.2), it is a special kind of commitment that is justifiable, at least some of the time.
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that there are general principles that regulate such updates of the common
ground. These principles are discussed in Section 4, but the basic idea is that com-
mon ground can be defined in terms of the interlocutors’ commitments, and then
the main effects that speech acts have on the common ground are captured by
two rules that hold for all speech acts. In this respect, too, constatives are merely
a special case.
Similarly, and fourthly, the observation that constatives often express beliefs
generalises to the observation that speech acts quite generally license the infer-
ence that their sincerity conditions are fulfilled (to borrow Searle’s 1969 termin-
ology). For example, if Agnes tells Bruce that she is pregnant, it will normally
be understood that she believes to be pregnant; if she promises Bruce to go, that
she intends to go; if she orders Bruce to go, that she intends him to go; and so
on. In Section 5, it is shown how, in a commitment-based framework, these infer-
ences are derivable as conversational implicatures, again in a perfectly general
and uniform way.
3.4 Minor speech act types
Having sampled the three major illocutionary types, we are left with a motley
crew of cases, which includes greetings, condolences, apologies, verdicts, and
more. Within this miscellany, two main types are often distinguished. These will
be briefly discussed here, partly in order to add some further touches to the pro-
posed account, and partly to show, pace Green (2007: 76), among others, that
these speech acts, too, are commitment inducers.
First, there is a class of utterances whose main function, according to many
authors, is to express psychological states, which is why Searle and Vanderveken
(1985) dub them “expressives”. Bach and Harnish (1979: 51) give the following
examples: “greeting expresses pleasure at meeting or seeing someone, thanking
expresses gratitude for having received something, apologizing expresses regret
for having harmed or bothered the hearer.” On reflection, it is doubtful that greet-
ings generally express pleasure, and it may also be doubted that expressing a
psychological state is themain purpose of any of these speech acts. It seems more
plausible, for example, that the main purpose of greetings is to open and close
bouts of social interaction.
However, we will let these candidate issues lie and focus on what is the key
point for our current purposes: even if it is correct that the main function of
these and other speech acts is to express psychological states, then that doesn’t
preclude a commitment-based analysis. On the contrary, it is entirely natural to
interpret (or reinterpret) “expressing” in terms of commitment: thanking commits
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the speaker to being grateful, apologising commits her to being regretful, and
so on. This analysis brings expressives in line with the major speech acts, all of
which create commitments of the form Ca,bp. The distinctive feature of expressive
speech acts is just that p attributes a psychological state to a, a feature they share
with first-person attitude reports, like:
(5) I believe there is nutmeg in the pudding.
Come to think of it, this analysis suggests that expressive speech acts are a sub-
class of constatives, namely, those that attribute a psychological state to the
speaker. This suggestion is strengthened by the observation that, attitudes aside,
(5) and (6) seem to share the same semantic blueprint:
(6) I’m sorry there is nutmeg in the pudding.
In stark contrast to expressives, the psychology of the speaker seems wholly
irrelevant to the conventional speech acts that Austin (1962) was preoccupied
with:
(7) I find the defendant guilty of armed robbery.
(8) I christen this ship the USS Stormy Daniels.
(9) I hereby declare war on the Balearics.
No matter whether the judge believes the defendant to be guilty or not, by utter-
ing (7) a verdict will have been pronounced in either case; likewise, mutatis
mutandis, for (8) and (9), when uttered by the incumbent US president, for
example. In none of these cases do the felicitousness and success of the speech
act depend on the speaker’s beliefs, intentions, or any other psychological states.
However, it is clear that each of these speech acts causes the speaker to become
committed to act on the proposition expressed. A judge who utters (7) henceforth
is expected to act on The defendant is guilty of armed robbery; and likewise,
mutatis mutandis, for (8) and (9).
3.5 Commitments and communicative intentions
In his landmark 1964 paper, Strawson proposed a dichotomy between Austinian
speech acts involving “rule- or convention-governed practices and procedures of
which they essentially form parts” (p. 457), on the one hand, and speech acts
that are not conventional in this sense, on the other. On Strawson’s account, a
non-conventional speech act essentially involves what has come to be called a
“communicative intention”, which is an intention to produce in the hearer a belief
or other attitude by means of her recognition of this very intention. (This is how
Grice’s 1957 concept of “non-natural meaning” entered the speech act literature,
albeit under a different name.) For example, if Agnes informs Bruce that tea is
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ready, then she intends him to form the belief that tea is ready because he grasps
her intention.
Strawson’s dichotomy has been highly influential, and is respected even
by theories like Kissine’s (2013a) that adopt a non-Gricean analysis of non-
conventional speech acts. Therefore, it is of some interest to note that the theory
proposed here offers a unified account of conventional and non-conventional
speech acts. For, as observed above, there is no reason to exempt conventional
speech acts from the general principle that a speech act causes a commitment for
the speaker. This is not to reject Strawson’s dichotomy altogether, but it is to say
that it is not fundamental to my account the way it is to Bach and Harnish’s (1979)
or Kissine’s (2013a), among many others.
Although dissenting opinions aren’t rare, the mainstream doctrine across
disciplines is that human communication essentially involves expressing and
grasping communicative intentions. I am with the dissenters. Commitments can
do most of the theoretical work that communicative intentions are held to do,
and they can do a great deal more. As discussed three paragraphs ago, whereas
intention-based theories cannot accommodate conventional speech acts, exem-
plified by (12)–(14), and therefore write them off as non-communicative uses of
language (e.g. Bach and Harnish 1979), a commitment-based analysis applies
to conventional and non-conventional speech acts alike. Further proof of the
explanatory power of commitments will be given in the following sections.
In addition to these explanatory virtues, there is one consideration that is
relevant in the bigger scheme of things. Intention-based communication is essen-
tially a matter of conveying communicative intentions: it is the speaker’s job to
express a communicative intention and the hearer’s to grasp it. Hence, in order to
be successful, every speech act requires that the speaker knows beforehand, and
that the hearer comes to know, what the speaker’s communicative intention is.
Not so with commitments. Commitments are interpersonal relationships that are
established in thewake of our social activities, and it is entirely possible to engage
in the game of sharing and acting on commitments without knowing one’s com-
mitments or others’, and indeed without knowing what commitments are. This is
an important reason to believe that the prospects for commitment-based theories
of the ontogeny and phylogeny of human communication are a lot rosier than for
intention-based accounts.
4 Common ground
Having thus far studied speech acts from the speaker’s standpoint, from now
on the focus will be on interpersonal aspects of communication, starting with
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common ground. Since its introduction by Grice in his William James lectures
of 1967, common ground has become one of the key notions in pragmatics,
figuring prominently in theories of convention (Lewis 1969; Geurts 2018a), con-
versational implicatures (Grice 1975; Geurts 2010), reference (Clark and Marshall
1981), presupposition (Stalnaker 1973, 2002), speech acts (Bach and Harnish
1979), vagueness (Lewis 1979), and many other pragmatic phenomena. By defin-
ition, the common ground contains information that is “in the open”, and this
openness is standardly characterised in terms of mutual (or common) knowledge
or belief. The fingerprint of these mutualistic notions is their iterative structure,
illustrated here with mutual belief. Using Bxp as a shorthand for “x believes p”, it
is mutual belief between a and b that p iff:
Bap and Bbp,
BaBbp and BbBap,
BaBbBap and BbBaBbp,
...
This endless cascade has prompted the strangely persistent myth that common
ground, thus characterised, is impossible to achieve in real life, and that there-
fore the concept is best abandoned altogether. (An outstanding source of this
myth, among others, was Sperber andWilson 1986.) However, for reasons already
explained by Lewis, this objection is unfounded. The critical point is that the
iterative structure of common ground “is a chain of implications, not of steps in
anyone’s actual reasoning. Therefore there is nothing improper about its infinite
length.” (Lewis 1969: 53)
Although Lewis’s reply settles thematter, it does nothing to explain how com-
mon ground is achieved. It is widely agreed that there are two main ways. One is
that there are many types of situations, or “bases” as Lewis calls them, that create
common ground (Clark 1992, 1996). People interacting with each other will soon
find out whether they share the same language, the same social background, the
same hobbies, and so on, and any of these commonalities will serve as a basis
for common ground. The second way of reaching common ground is by means
of communication. For example, an utterance of “Clyde snores” may be seen, fol-
lowing Stalnaker (1978), as a proposal to augment the common ground with the
information that Clyde snores, and as a rule this information will become part of
the common ground, unless the hearer objects. It is this way of building common
ground that we will be concerned with here.
In the current framework, it is natural to analyse common ground in terms of
mutual commitment, which is defined as follows: a and b aremutually committed
to act on p iff:
Brought to you by | Radboud University Nijmegen
Authenticated
Download Date | 11/14/19 1:53 PM
Communication as commitment sharing 17
Ca,bp and Cb,ap,
Ca,bCb,ap and Cb,aCa,bp,
Ca,bCb,aCa,bp and Cb,aCa,bCb,ap,
...
Mutual commitment has the same iterative structure as mutual belief and mutual
knowledge, and by and large it can do the same theoretical work as its doxastic
and epistemic cousins. But there are very substantial differences, too. Whereas
on the received view, the common ground is an information pool that supports
interactions between its owners, construing it as a set of mutual commitments
entails that common ground is a normative construct, which not only supports
but also constrains actions, and thus helps to coordinate them. Moreover, mutual
commitment is a social concept, not a psychological one, and it doesn’t entail
belief, let alone mutual belief. Henceforth, I will use the terms “common ground”
and “mutual commitment” interchangeably.
Having shown how common ground can be represented by means of commit-
ments, let us now consider how communication changes the common ground.We
start with the observation that every speech act type is associated with a normal
response: questions tend to get answered, requests tend to be granted, assertions
tend to be accepted, and so on. Of course, these normal responses aren’t always
obtained, and sometimes not even expected; but most of the time they are expec-
ted and obtained. One of the strong points of the theory on offer is that it allows
us to formulate a simple rule that captures all these cases at once. Let’s say that
a and b share a commitment to act on p iff Ca,bp and Cb,ap. Then the rule is that
commitments are normally shared:
Commitment sharing: If Ca,bp, then ceteris paribus Cb,ap.
The sharing rule entails that, whenever a performs a speech act that causes Ca,bp,
then ceteris paribus Cb,ap will come to hold, too. Thus we obtain the following
predictions:
Ceteris paribus:
(10) If Agnes tells Bruce, “Clyde is mowing the lawn”, then Bruce becomes
committed to act on Clyde is mowing the lawn.
(11) If Agnes promises Bruce, “I’ll mow the lawn”, then Bruce becomes commit-
ted to act on Agnes will mow the lawn.
(12) If Bruce asks Agnes, “Can you pass the gravy, please?”, then Agnes becomes
committed to act on Agnes will pass the gravy.
(13) If Bruce asks Agnes, “Is Donald gay?”, then Agnes becomes committed to
commit herself to act either on Donald is gay or on Donald is not gay.
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Note that a shared commitment may be telic for one party but not for the other.
(11) is a case in point.
What is the status of the sharing rule? To begin with, it seems correct from
a descriptive point of view: it does seem to be the case that, normally speaking,
statements are accepted as true, requests are granted, questions answered, and so
on. The reason why this pattern holds is not that speech acts have a mysteriously
compelling force, but because in general interlocutors are cooperative: speakers
seek to ask questions that will be answered, make statements that will be accep-
ted, and so on, and hearers will respond accordingly, more often than not.8 If
this explanation is correct, the sharing rule doesn’t cause the interactive pattern
it captures, but nevertheless, if sharing is the normal case, as the rule states, then
speakers and hearersmay come to treat it as normative to some degree: we answer
questions not only because we like to help, or because we’re accustomed to do so,
but also because we are supposed to do so. In the same way, the sharing rule may
also become a motivating factor in the development of communicative skills.
Still, an addressee may decline to share a commitment made by the speaker.
Bruce tells Agnes that Napoleon was Greek, but she refuses to believe him; or
Agnes promises Bruce to be at the station when he arrives, but he tells her that
she is not going to make it on time. In such cases, the speaker’s commitment is
not necessarily voided, though it may become pointless. Even if Agnes refuses
to accept Bruce’s statement as true, he may decide to stick to his commitment,
and try to convince her that he is right. But when Bruce expresses doubts about
Agnes’s promise, he cannot expect her to stick to her commitment, though she
might. In short, it depends on the case. Commitment sharing is the norm, and
unshared commitments undercut the main purpose of communication, but they
do not defeat it altogether. Even if Bruce fails to convince Agnes, they may agree
to disagree, which is a form of coordination, too.
Before the addressee can act on the speaker’s commitment, he must first
accept that a commitment was made in the first place. There are many ways in
which this precondition can fail to hold: the addressee may be out of earshot,
deaf, unconscious, suffer from receptive aphasia, and so on. Briefly, a commit-
ment requires “uptake”, as Austin (1962) called it (cf. Clark 1996, chapter 8, Kibble
2006a). I take this to mean that a’s commitment to act on p doesn’t hold unless
b commits herself to act on the proposition that a is thus committed. Acceptance
may be signalled (“Hmm”, “Okay”, . . . ), but it may also be merely implied by the
8 This is not the same thing as cooperativity in Grice’s (1975) sense of the word. Gricean cooper-
ativity requires a common goal, and though it may be true that when I answer your question, for
example, your goal thereby becomes a common goal (or, in the jargon of this paper, amutual telic
commitment), it is not generally the case that questions address common goals.
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hearer’s response (an appropriate answer implies acceptance of the commitment
associated with the question, for example), and even in the absence of overt clues
acceptance is usually taken for granted.
Although, in the speech act literature, the responsibility for acceptance is
supposed to lie with the addressee alone, it seems reasonable to hold the speaker
responsible, too. In fact, it is hard to see how a speaker could commit herself to
act on p without committing herself to being committed to act on p. Therefore,
acceptance must be shared between speaker and hearer:
Acceptance: Ca,bp entails Ca,bCa,bp and Cb,aCa,bp.
It must be stressed that, whereas commitment sharing is merely a default, Accept-
ance is proposed as a prerequisite for commitment. Commitment is a relation
between two consenting parties, and there is no commitment unless it is accepted
by both.
It immediately follows from the definition of Acceptance that a speaker
cannot have a commitment without it being common ground that he is thus
committed. That is to say, Ca,bp entails that
Ca,bCa,bp and Cb,aCa,bp,
Ca,bCb,aCa,bp and Cb,aCa,bCa,bp,
Ca,bCb,aCa,bCa,bp and Cb,aCa,bCb,aCa,bp,
...
Furthermore, it follows that shared commitments are eo ipso common ground:
if Ca,bp and Cb,ap, then it must be the case that there is a mutual commit-
ment between a and b to act on p. Hence, commitments are twice grounded
in concordant commitments between interlocutors (cf. Clark 1992, 1996, Geurts
2018a).
To sum up, this analysis of common ground captures the intuitive idea that
commitments between speakers are “in the open”, and it does so on two levels.
First, commitments cannot exist without it being common ground that they
exist: Agnes’s promise to Bruce doesn’t commit her to anything unless it is com-
mon ground between her and Bruce that she has undertaken a commitment.
Second, a shared commitment is necessarily a mutual commitment: if Agnes
and Bruce agree to do the dishes together, they don’t have a shared commit-
ment unless it is common ground between them that they will do the dishes
together.
By defining common ground as mutual commitment we don’t lose any of the
advantages of standard definitions in terms of knowledge or belief. For example,
analyses of presupposition, definite reference, and convention are accommodated
just as easily in the present framework as in standard ones. This is important,
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because, as noted at the beginning of this section, common ground is widely
agreed to be fundamental to communication, and a key factor in a wide range
of pragmatic phenomena. The distinctive feature of mutual commitment is that
it entails neither belief nor knowledge. This implies that Agnes and Bruce may
agree that Napoleon was Greek even though it is mutual belief between them that
he was French. I welcome this consequence, not only because it enables us to
treat telic and atelic commitments on a par, but also because it opens the door
to analyses of pretence, fiction, and hypothesising that treat these forms of dis-
course as continuous with “ordinary” discourse (cf. Geurts 2017). Nevertheless, it
is obviously true that in much of our everyday interactions common ground does
entail belief. In the upcoming section it will be explained why that is the case.
5 Conversational implicature
From the late 1950s onwards, Grice launched several concepts that have been
instrumental in defining the field of pragmatics. Two of these were discussed
in the foregoing: communicative intention, which derives from Grice’s “non-
natural meaning” (Section 3.5), and common ground (Section 4). This section
is about conversational implicature, which is yet another key pragmatic concept
contributed by Grice. My objective in the following pages is to show how conver-
sational implicatures may be analysed in a commitment-based framework. This
will involve some rethinking, because Gricean pragmatics is cast in psychological
terms.
Grice (1975) sees communication as a collaborative effort. A discourse is a
joint project aimed at achieving one or several common goals. Common goals are
part of the common ground; in the jargon of this paper, they are mutual com-
mitments of the telic variety. Given that communication is a joint project, it is
natural to suppose that an utterance p will normally be interpreted in the light
of the current discourse goals, on the assumption that p was designed by the
speaker to further these goals. In other words, hearers will assume that speak-
ers abide by Grice’s “Cooperative Principle”, which enjoins the speaker to tailor
his utterances to the discourse goals (1975/1989: 26). The Cooperative Principle is
Grice’s “overarching principle” for a theory of cooperative communication. Grice
presents his theory as a collection of more specific “maxims”, loosely arranged
into four rubrics (1975/1989: 26–27):
– Quality: Try to make your contribution one that is true:
1. Do not say what you believe to be false.
2. Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence.
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– Quantity:
1. Make your contribution as informative as is required (for the current
purposes of the exchange).
2. Do not make your contribution more informative than is required.
– Relation: Be relevant.
– Manner: Be perspicuous:
1. Avoid obscurity of expression.
2. Avoid ambiguity.
3. Be brief (avoid unnecessary prolixity).
4. Be orderly.
Note that, for the most part, the Gricean maxims are formulated in non-psycho-
logical terms. The only exception is the first Quality maxim, which refers to the
speaker’s beliefs. This maxim will soon receive due attention, but first we turn to
the pragmatic inferences licensed by the maxims: conversational implicatures, or
“implicatures” for short. An implicature is “what has to be supposed in order to
preserve the supposition that the Cooperative Principle is being observed” (Grice
1975/1989: 39–40). Implicatures are derived on the basis of what the speaker says,
the common ground, and the assumption that the speaker is being cooperat-
ive. Grice provides a general schema for deriving implicatures, which is replete
with psychological terminology. According to this schema, a hearer is entitled to
reason as follows:
[The speaker] has said that p; there is no reason to suppose that he is not
observing the maxims, or at least the Cooperative Principle; he could not be
doing this unless he thought that q; he knows (and knows that I know that he
knows) that I can see that the supposition that he thinks that q is required;
he has done nothing to stop me thinking that q; he intends me to think, or is
at least willing to allow me to think, that q; and so he has implicated that q.
(Grice 1975/1989: 31)
Based on this schema, it may seem natural to suppose that the Gricean concept
of implicature itself is irredeemably psychological. However, that is not the case,
for we can recast Grice’s schema in non-psychological terms, along the following
lines:
It is common ground that:
i. the speaker has said that p;
ii. he observes the maxims;
iii. he could not be doing this unless he was committed to q;
iv. he has done nothing to prevent q from becoming common ground;
v. he is committed to the goal that q become common ground.
And so he has implicated that q.
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Two caveats are in order here. First, in my version of the Gricean schema I have
cut down on the characteristic hedging of the original version. Second, since the
point of this exercise is merely to show that Grice’s reasoning can be replicated in
terms of commitment, the quality of the reasoning is no better than in the original.
That quality is somewhat debatable, though it must be stressed that Grice was
aiming for plausibility rather than proof: conversational implicatures are infer-
ences to the best explanation, and therefore not expected to be deductively valid
(Geurts 2010: 36–39, 73–74).
In order to bolster the claim that Gricean pragmatics can be embedded in a
commitment-based framework, we need a Gricean theory that achieves at least a
modest standard of explicitness and rigour. To date, there are no general theor-
ies of implicature that meet this requirement. However, there are partial theories
that go some of the way. The most prominent case in point is the Gricean analysis
of quantity implicatures, the first explicit version of which was given by Soames
(1982) (see Geurts 2010, chapter 2, for discussion). This analysis is standardly
formulated in terms of intentions and beliefs, but it is easily recast in terms of
commitments, as I will show with the following example. Alice reports to Brian
that she has caught Clyde handling her purse, whereupon he fled the scene while
she checked her purse to find that:
(14) Clyde took some of the money.
Alice’s utterance is likely to imply that Clyde didn’t steal all the money. This infer-
ence can be accounted for as an implicature based on the first Quantity maxim,
along the following lines:
It is common ground that:
i. Instead of saying (14), Alice could have made a stronger statement:
(15) Clyde took all the money.
This raises the question why Alice uttered (14) rather than (15).
ii. The most likely explanation is that Alice doesn’t have sufficient evidence
to be committed to act on (15). [weak implicature]
iii. Alice has sufficient evidence to be committed to act on either (15) or
¬(15).
iv. Between them, (ii) and (iii) entail that Alice has sufficient evidence to be
committed to act on ¬(15).
v. Therefore, Alice is committed to act on ¬(15). [strong implicature]
And so Alice has implicated that Clyde didn’t take all the money.
This derivation follows the standard recipe, but sans beliefs or intentions. Two
glosses may be helpful here. First, (iii) is implied by the context: given that Alice
checked her purse, she either has evidence that Clyde took all her money or she
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has evidence that he took only some of it. If this assumption didn’t hold, the con-
clusion that Clyde didn’t take all the money would not follow, though the weaker
implicature in (ii) might still hold. Secondly, (v) is entailed by (iv) on the premiss
that, if it is common ground that x has sufficient evidence to be committed to
the truth of p, then x is committed to the truth of p. So here it is critical that the
protasis is common ground.
We now return to the first Quality maxim, which enjoins the speaker not to
say what she believes to be false. This is the only maxim that refers to a psycholo-
gical state, and I can’t see how it could be reformulated in terms of commitment,
understood as a social relation. However, this is not to say that Quality1 cannot
be reformulated in terms of commitment at all. As briefly discussed in Section 2,
we undertake commitments so as to coordinate our actions, and action coordina-
tion takes place on more than one level. The bulk of this paper deals with action
coordination between people, because my working hypothesis is that this is the
key level for understanding communication. However, in a broader perspective,
action coordination for oneself is no less important than coordination with oth-
ers, and just as we make social commitments to others so as to coordinate our
actions with theirs, we make private commitments to ourselves to coordinate our
own actions (cf. Clark 2006, Geurts 2018b). In the remainder of this section, I will
explain how private commitments can help to account for Quality1 implicatures,
and much more.
I have argued elsewhere that private commitments are essentially involved
in self talk (Geurts 2018b). People do not only talk to others; they also talk to
themselves, and self talk is associated with a variety of higher mental func-
tions, including reasoning, problem solving, planning, attention, and motivation
(Winsler 2009, Vicente and Martinez Manrique 2011). As long as we adopt the
received view that defines communication as information exchange, self talk is an
anomaly, because it is hard to see the point of exchanging information with one-
self. However, if communication is viewed as a way of negotiating commitments
between speaker and hearer, then communication may be useful even when
speaker and hearer coincide. For, whereas information exchange with oneself is
futile, making commitments to oneself is not.
To illustrate, suppose that Brian promises Alice and himself to mow the lawn.
Brian’s promise to Alice entitles her to plan her activities on the premiss that Brian
will mow the lawn, so she can take it as given that she will not have to do it, that
Brian will be out of the house for at least an hour, and so on. Likewise, Brian’s
promise to himself entitles him to make his plans on the premiss that he will mow
the lawn, so he will not have to ask Alice to do it, he will be busy for at least an
hour, and so on. Thus social and private commitments serve the same purpose. If
Ca,bp, a’s commitment helps a and b to coordinate their activities. The difference
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between social and private commitments is mainly that a ≠ b in the former case,
while a = b in the latter.
It is a recurrent theme in the philosophy of language that commitments are
closely linked to, if not equatable with, beliefs and/or intentions.9 Thus Brandom
(1997) distinguishes between
[ . . . ] doxastic commitments, which do much of the theoretical work usually
done by notions of belief, and practical commitments (commitments to do
something), which do much of the theoretical work usually done by notions
of intention. (p. 199)
Although Brandom’s practical/doxastic distinction doesn’t coincide with my
telic/atelic distinction, the two are related, and we can transpose Brandom’s
statement into the present framework as follows: private telic commitments are
intentions, and private atelic commitments are beliefs. If Brian is privately com-
mitted to act on Brian will do the dishes, then he intends to do the dishes, and
if he is privately committed to act on Napoleon was Greek, then he believes that
Napoleon was Greek.
But couldn’t Brian be committed to act on Napoleon was Greek, and still
believe that he was French? Not unless his commitment was merely social, half-
hearted, or both. While our social commitments primarily constrain our public
actions, whole-hearted private commitments constrain our actions across the
board, including the ones we perform for ourselves. So only if Brian’s private con-
duct respects the premiss that Napoleon was Greek is he privately committed that
Napoleon was Greek. But in that case he believes that Napoleon was Greek. The
same, mutatis mutandis, for private telic commitments and intentions.
The claim that private commitments are beliefs and intentions does not entail
that beliefs and intentions are subtypes of private commitments. Our everyday
notion of belief has several aspects, only one of which can be equated with the
notion of private atelic commitment. One aspect is dispositional: we attribute
beliefs on the basis of what a person tends to do. Another aspect is normative:
we attribute beliefs on the basis of what a person is supposed to do. Since there
is a positive correlation between what we are supposed and disposed to do, these
two aspects of belief are closely related. A third aspect is properly mentalistic: we
localise beliefs in their owners, and treat them as the underlying causes of their
actions. Other mental-state concepts, like intention, may be broken down along
the same lines.10
9 See Segerberg (1984) and Bratman (1987) on the commitment/intention nexus, Jacquette (2013)
on belief, and Brandom (1994) on both.
10 It is widely accepted that mental-state concepts are not always unitary, and while there is
no consensus on what the relevant parts or aspects are, it is a common idea that beliefs and
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I believe that dispositions and norms are the workhorses of our folk psycho-
logy, and that we interpret, explain, and predict the bulk of people’s behaviour
(including our own) in terms ofwhat they are supposed and/or disposed to do; the
whereabouts of a mental state are seldom of interest. This holds in particular for
social interaction and more in particular for communication. However, this is as
it may be, for the main point is that belief and intention are composite concepts,
and that only their normative aspects can be equated with private commitments.
With this proviso, let’s suppose that private commitments are intentions (if telic)
and beliefs (if not).
Although from a communicative point of view, it is perfectly possible to
undertake conflicting commitments, it will be clear that, generally speaking, one
shouldn’t do so, and is expected not to do so. If Alice accepts Brian’s marriage
proposal as well as Clyde’s, she may have successfully undertaken conflicting
commitments, but nevertheless her conduct is dubious, because at least one of
her two bids for action coordination is bound to come up empty. Hence, being
rational and responsible agents, we expect one another to honour the following
maxim:
Integrity: If Ca,bp then ¬Ca,c¬p.
In prose, the Integrity maxim enjoins speakers to avoid conflicting commitments.
Having promised to marry Brian as well as Clyde, Alice’s commitments viol-
ate this maxim, because the propositions that she will marry Brian and Clyde,
respectively, cannot be true together.
While the Integrity maxim holds for any a, b, and c, it has two submaxims
that are of special interest. First, if b = c, we have:
Consistency: If Ca,bp then ¬Ca,b¬p.
As observed in Section 2, this is notmerely amaxim, but a prerequisite for commit-
ment: making contradictory commitments to one and the same person is no better
than making no commitment at all, and possibly worse. The second submaxim
follows from Integrity if a = c:
Sincerity: If Ca,bp then ¬Ca,a¬p.11
Whenever a ≠ b, this maxim yokes a’s private commitments, i.e. her beliefs and
intentions, to her social commitments. To illustrate the implications of this sub-
intentions have a normative aspect (see, e.g. Dennett 1987, Frankish 2004, Apperly 2011, Zawidzki
2013).
11 As it is used here, “sincerity” is a term of art, which means just what it is defined to mean.
For reasons given by Ridge (2006), I wouldn’t want to claim that this definition fully captures our
pre-theoretical notion of sincerity, although it is not such a bad approximation either.
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maxim, suppose it is common ground between Alice and Brian that she is sincere.
Then all of the following hold:
(16) If Alice tells Brian she is pregnant, she doesn’t believe she is not pregnant.
(17) If Alice promises Brian to go, she doesn’t intend not to go.
(18) If Alice orders Brian to go, she doesn’t intend him not to go.
If Alice believes that she is not pregnant, then Ca,a¬(a is pregnant), and it follows
from the Sincerity maxim that she musn’t act in such a way that she undertakes
Ca,b(a is pregnant). That is to say, if she believes she is not pregnant, she shouldn’t
tell Brian that she is, and therefore, if she tells Brian that she is pregnant, she
implicates that she doesn’t believe she is not pregnant. (17) and (18) are derivable
in much the same way.
While the implicatures in (16)–(18) are correct as far as they go, they are
relatively weak, and often enough addressees are entitled to make stronger
inferences:
(19) If Alice tells Brian she is pregnant, she believes she is pregnant.
(20) If Alice promises Brian to go, she intends to go
(21) If Alice orders Brian to go, she intends him to go.
(Note that, on Grice’s account, (19) is derivable as a Quality1 implicature, but (20)
and (21) are not.) The general situation is as follows. Courtesy of the Sincerity
maxim, we can derive an implicature of the form ¬Ca,a¬p, which is correct but
not always as strong as what we would like to have, which is an implicature
of the form Ca,ap. This is reminiscent of the distinction between weak and
strong Quantity1 implicatures, discussed above, and I propose to adopt the same
style of analysis in this case, too. The idea is that ¬Ca,a¬p is strengthened to
Ca,ap whenever it is common ground that Ca,ap ∨ Ca,a¬p. To see how this solu-
tion applies to the examples at hand, consider (16) again. Suppose Alice either
believes that she is pregnant or believes that she is not pregnant. Surely, this
premiss holds for most womenmost of the time, and perhaps it is evenmore likely
to be true in the kind of situation that prompts a woman to assert that she is preg-
nant. Anyway, whatever the odds, if this premiss holds, it is of the form Ca,ap
∨ Ca,a¬p. Due to the Sincerity assumption, Alice’s statement causes the commit-
ment ¬Ca,a¬p, which rules out the second disjunct, and thus it follows that Ca,ap:
Alice believes that she is pregnant. On parallel assumptions, (20) and (21) are
derivable from (17) and (18), respectively.
According to this analysis, the strengthening of sincerity implicatures
depends on the context, but that dependence does not make it as tenuous as one
might think. To see why, note that the auxiliary premiss Ca,ap ∨ Ca,a¬p merely
eliminates the possibility that a hasn’t made up her mind as to whether she is
privately committed to p or to ¬p. This much should be plausible enough in many
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contexts, but especially in such contexts that license sincerity implicatures in the
first place, where a just undertook a social commitment to p.
To conclude, the proposed account predicts that, courtesy of the Sincerity
maxim, there will be a general trend for an utterance causing Ca,bp to also cause
¬Ca,a¬p and Ca,ap as knock-on effects, so to speak. This captures Quality1 infer-
ences, and many more besides, because the analysis generalises across speech
act types. Whereas Grice’s Quality maxims are tailored to assertions, the Integrity
maxim (of which Sincerity is a special case) uniformly applies to all speech acts.
The range of strong implicatures licensed by the Sincerity maxim roughly coin-
cides with the range of Searle’s “sincerity conditions” (Searle 1969; Searle and
Vanderveken 1985). However, whereas on Searle’s analysis sincerity conditions
have to be stipulated for each speech act type individually, the analysis proposed
here derives Sincerity implicatures from the social commitments associated with
speech acts, and does so in a perfectly regular way. (For further discussion of
sincerity, see Falkenberg 1997, Ridge 2006, and Lauer 2013.)
6 Conclusion
I take it that the first order of business for any theory of linguistic communication
is to explain what speech acts are, how they interact with the common ground,
and how they give rise to Gricean inferences. The orthodox way of dealing with
these requirements is to start from the general assumption that the principal pur-
pose of communication is the exchange of information, specifically information
about the speakers’ mental states, and more specifically about their communi-
cative intentions. Although it is by no means unprecedented, the approach I have
taken in this paper is heterodox. It starts from the assumption that the principal
purpose of communication is to share commitments that serve to facilitate action
coordination. In the foregoing I have shown how speech acts can be uniformly
analysed as commitment-sharing devices; how common ground can be defined
in terms of commitments, which are updated by speech acts in accordance with
simple and quite general principles; how conversational implicatures can be
derived in a commitment-based framework; and how beliefs and intentions can
be viewed as private commitments, which are key elements in my analyses of self
talk and sincerity implicatures.
Needless to say, the general framework outlined here needs further devel-
opment in all sorts of ways, but it shouldn’t be hard to see that it will easily
accommodate extant analyses of a wide variety of pragmatic phenomena, includ-
ing presupposition, reference, convention, and figurative meaning. In many
cases, this is true even if the analyses in question were originally formulated in
mentalistic frameworks. Which is to say that, when viewed topic by topic, the
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shift in perspective from the psychological to the social is less consequential than
it might seem at first.
It bears emphasising that adopting a commitment-based approach does not
require that we give up on the idea that speech acts express mental states. On the
contrary, even if social commitments are now in the driver’s seat, mental states
retain a very respectable position in the back seat, and it could hardly be oth-
erwise. It would be futile to deny that the main job of some speech acts is to
express belief (“I believe this is oregano”) or joy (“Hurrah!”), for example, and the
commitment-based analysis of speech acts allows for this, as it should. But more
importantly, we have seen how private commitments, i.e. beliefs and intentions,
are derivable from social commitments in a principled way, while still allowing
for cases in which sincerity inferences are not observed, like the conventional
speech acts discussed in Section 3.4. Therefore, the commitment-based account
is consistent with the possibility that, much if not most of the time, speech acts
expressmental states, even if mental-state attribution is less central to the current
account than to the received view, and not a prerequisite for communication. Thus
it is readily explained how children can have a basic understanding of promising,
say, without understanding that promises express intentions.
Speaking of children, we saw in the introduction that by making mental-
state attribution a sine qua non for linguistic communication, the received view
makes it hard, if not impossible, to construct ontogenetic or phylogenetic mod-
els without breakthrough events, like when a toddler is suddenly struck by the
realisation that the utterance, “I’ll buy you an ice cream”, expresses the parent’s
intention to let the child believe, due to its understanding of that very intention,
that he or she intends to provide the child with an ice cream.
On the view expounded in this paper, children must find their way into a
normative practice of sharing commitments and planning their actions accord-
ingly. They are aided in the process by the statistical regularities created by this
very practice. Promising an ice cream, for example, is a social practice that cre-
ates significant correlations between speech patterns and subsequent patterns of
behaviour. Once attuned to these correlations, the child still has to proceed from
what people are disposed to do to what they are supposed to do. But that trans-
ition can be piecemeal and gradual, and may therefore be accounted for without
breakthrough events of any kind.
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